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Abstract The question of whether non-human animals are conscious is of
fundamental importance. There are already good reasons to think that many are,
based on evolutionary continuity and other considerations. However, the hypothesis
is notoriously resistant to direct empirical test. Numerous studies have shown
behaviour in animals analogous to consciously-produced human behaviour. Fewer
probe whether the same mechanisms are in use. One promising line of evidence
about consciousness in other animals derives from experiments on metamemory. A
study by Hampton (Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 98(9):5359–5362, 2001) suggests that
at least one rhesus macaque can use metamemory to predict whether it would itself
succeed on a delayed matching-to-sample task. Since it is not plausible that mere
meta-representation requires consciousness, Hampton’s study invites an important
question: what kind of metamemory is good evidence for consciousness? This paper
argues that if it were found that an animal had a memory trace which allowed it to
use information about a past perceptual stimulus to inform a range of different
behaviours, that would indeed be good evidence that the animal was conscious. That
functional characterisation can be tested by investigating whether successful per-
formance on one metamemory task transfers to a range of new tasks. The paper goes
on to argue that thinking about animal consciousness in this way helps in formu-
lating a more precise functional characterisation of the mechanisms of conscious
awareness.
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Investigating animal consciousness. Why? How?
There is a wealth of research on animals’ metacognitive abilities. Some
experiments are interpreted as furnishing direct empirical evidence of conscious-
ness in animal subjects. Although evolutionary and neurological continuity give us
good reason to think that some other animals are conscious, it is notoriously
difﬁcult to test that hypothesis directly, or to tell how far consciousness extends
into the animal kingdom. We aim to show that conclusions about animal
consciousness can be drawn from experiments on metacognition. Our focus is
metamemory: an individual’s ability to keep track of whether she accurately
remembers a stimulus. We take metamemory as an illustrative case. It is not the
only way in which conclusions about animal consciousness can be based on
experimental observations, but by working through various methodological and
philosophical objections in detail in this one case, we hope to demonstrate the
merits of the broader methodology for investigating consciousness that we
propose.
Since our focus is on evidence for consciousness, we do not aim to review the
large comparative literature on metamemory, let alone metacognition in general. Of
the many sorts of metamemory that have been studied, we are interested in the type
of metamemory that can play an additional role, forming a plausible basis for
inferences about consciousness. Which type of metamemory is indeed good
evidence for consciousness—which type will do the trick?
To do the trick, the ability must be characterised in non-consciousness-
involving terms C, in a way that makes it plausible that a subject’s meeting
condition C in relation to a perceptual stimulus is good evidence that they
consciously remember it. Testing for condition C will then be one empirically-
tractable way to probe whether other animals are conscious. Even those who reject
higher order thought as necessary for consciousness should accept that some type
of meta-representation can be evidence of consciousness. This paper addresses the
question: what variety of meta-representation is suited to playing that evidential
role?
The target of our investigation is phenomenal consciousness—the ‘‘what it’s
like’’-ness of our mental lives. When we reﬂect on consciousness from the ﬁrst
person perspective, it can seem as if explaining and investigating it further is
intractable. The logic of the approach taken here is to focus on what conscious
experience does for us—to look for ways of characterising its functional proﬁle.
For example, there is evidence that there are two different ways of forming an
association between a tone and a puff of air to the eye so that the tone comes to
cause an eye blink: ‘delay conditioning’ and ‘trace conditioning’. It seems that
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delay conditioning a puff of air to the eye is administered during the occurrence of
a tone (after the start of the tone, hence ‘delay’ conditioning). Delay conditioning
dissociates from awareness of the contingency between tone and air puff (Perruchet
1985). By contrast, it seems that trace conditioning—where the air puff occurs
shortly after the tone has stopped—correlates with subjects’ conscious awareness
of the contingency (Clark et al. 2001; Clark and Squire 1998; Perruchet et al.
2006). If it were established that only trace conditioning requires consciousness,
then the presence or absence of trace conditioning, and of the mechanisms which
underlie it, could be used as evidence as to whether other animals are conscious.
When following this method, it is important that the mechanism of trace
conditioning in humans be characterised in detail: its functional proﬁle, the brain
mechanisms involved, modes of intervening on or interfering with those
mechanisms, etc. Such a detailed characterisation C1 of the mechanism of trace
conditioning is much richer than the bare observation that trace conditioning
appears to correlate with verbal report of the contingency. The process of testing
whether C1 is present in other animals is correlatively more empirically tractable
(and falsiﬁable).
We call a task ‘consciousness-involving’ if humans’ performance of the task, or
their performance of the task in a particular way, correlates with their being
conscious of the task-relevant parameters, as indexed by subjects’ introspective and
environmental reports. We can study a range of consciousness-involving tasks (Jack
and Shallice 2001). Given thorough investigation, the mechanism deployed in each
consciousness-involving task can be characterised in detail: C1, C2, …, Cn. Each
such characterisation is then susceptible to independent investigation in animals,
without relying on verbal report, to see which other animals have the Ci mechanism.
The purpose of this paper is to arrive at such detailed characterisation in the case of
metamemory.
We should distinguish three types of potentially conscious state. First, there is the
online visual perception of a stimulus. Second, there is visual recall of a recent past
stimulus—the kind of state you are in when you shut your eyes and visualise the
scene you have just been looking at. Third, there is metamemory: some kind of
representation of your own visual memory. We ask whether states of the second
kind are conscious, and focus on whether states of the third kind are good evidence
of such consciousness. Information about an immediately past stimulus may be held
online without being conscious. The claim we are considering is that there is a type
of metamemory that correlates with the perceptual memory trace being conscious.
Information about an immediately past perceptual stimulus is clearly a form of
memory in the broadest sense. Where it falls in relation to the standard taxonomy of
memory partly depends upon whether it is conscious. If so, it would be explicit
rather than implicit. It would also be declarative rather than procedural, although
that is a distinction that is usually applied to long term memory, rather than the short
term memory involved in keeping information about an immediately past perceptual
trace online. It is also episodic in character. Indeed, debates about whether long term
episodic memory is evidence for consciousness in other species (e.g., Tulving 2005)
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uncover behaviour that depends upon information about the time and place of some
particular event in the animal’s past experience, the further question arises about the
circumstances in which the use of such episodic information provides evidence of
consciousness. The process we engage in here of examining the metamemory
literature with an eye to evidence about consciousness needs to be repeated for other
tasks, like those involving episodic memory, that might also allow for direct
empirical testing of consciousness in animals.
We will not discuss the neural mechanisms of human consciousness-involving
metamemory, although they may be an important part of the story, but will instead
aim at a broadly functional characterisation that can be carried across from humans
to other animals. We call this condition C. Our aim is to formulate the condition C
appropriate to consciousness-involving metamemory: what species of metamemory
goes with a human subject’s having a conscious perceptual memory of a stimulus?
Finding that other animals do indeed satisfy such a detailed functional condition, in
some circumstances, would then be good evidence that they were conscious in those
circumstances; evidence that could be further reinforced by data about neural
mechanisms (which there is not space to discuss here).
In formulating our condition C, we must walk a narrow ridge between tempting
mistakes of opposite kinds. On the one hand we might formulate a condition which
is in fact met by unconscious systems. That danger can be addressed by rigorous
studies in people to ensure that the presence or absence of our proposed condition C
does in fact correlate with the presence or absence of consciousness as measured by
verbal report. However, while we concentrate on avoiding the abyss of the
unconscious on one side, we may stray onto the comfortable slopes on the other
where consciousness is a decidedly human-only phenomenon. That is, to be sure
people only meet condition C when they are conscious we may formulate a
condition that is too strong, which we know only humans can meet, effectively
presupposing that animals cannot be conscious. For example, we might build verbal
report or its equivalent into condition C. The discipline of formulating a condition C
for which animals can be tested empirically should help to avoid settling on a
condition whose connection with consciousness is exempliﬁed only in humans. That
is our objective. We aim to formulate a condition C, associated with metamemory
tasks, for which non-human animals can be tested. The animal focus serves to ward
us off the comfortable slopes of anthropocentrism.
It follows from the logic of our approach that ﬁnding behaviour in animals
which is analogous to consciously-produced human behaviour has little forensic
merit. Showing that an animal can solve a problem that a human would solve
using metamemory casts little light on whether the animal is conscious.
Experiments must test whether humans and animals deploy the same mechanisms,
our focus here being on a functional characterisation of those mechanisms. In the
next section, ‘‘Animal data’’, we give examples of work on metamemory that has
moved towards this more stringent objective. In the following section, ‘‘Meta-
Memory: high level meta-representation’’, we specify the type of metamemory
which would be good evidence for consciousness and set out how it can be tested
in animals.
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Cowey and Stoerig (1995), Stoerig et al. (2002)
From the extensive literature on metacognition in non-human animals (Smith et al.
2003), we select two experimental paradigms, each to illustrate a particular point.
The ﬁrst, which we discuss in this section, was deployed by Cowey and Stoerig in
an elegant series of experiments on blindsight in monkeys (Cowey and Stoerig
1995, 1997; Stoerig et al. 2002). The second, discussed in the next section, is a
memory discrimination procedure used by Hampton (2001) to provide evidence of
meta-representation in a rhesus monkey. Both paradigms are based on the
‘commentary key’ method devised by Weiskrantz (1986, 1995).
Cowey and Stoerig studied monkeys with unilateral lesions of the primary visual
cortex comparable to those which, in humans, give rise to blindsight—voluntary
responding to visual stimuli in the absence of phenomenal consciousness. These
lesioned animals were compared with intact controls on two successive tasks. In the
ﬁrst, ‘localisation’ task, the monkeys were rewarded with food for touching the
visual target location, and the test stimuli were presented equally often in the right
hemiﬁeld, where one would expect lesion-induced impairment, and in the left
hemiﬁeld, where one would expect performance to be unaffected by the lesion. The
results indicated that, at appropriate stimulus intensities, the lesioned animals could
localise the stimuli presented to their right ‘blind’ ﬁeld with almost 100% accuracy.
The second, ‘detection’ task introduced the commentary key. In 50% of trials during
initial training on this detection task a visual target was presented in the normal ﬁeld
and the monkey was rewarded if it touched the target location. The other 50% of
trials were blanks, i.e., no target was presented, and the animal was rewarded if it
touched a box stimulus that was constantly present on the computer screen.
According to the logic of the commentary key method, touching this box constituted
a report by the animal that it had not seen a visual stimulus in that trial. Once this
discrimination had been mastered—once the animals were reliably touching the
target on target trials and the box on blank trials—visual targets in the right ‘blind’
ﬁeld began to be presented in 5% of trials. In these crucial probe trials reward was
programmed for delivery whether the animal touched the probe or the box. The
result was that the normal monkey consistently touched the probe, but the lesioned
animals nearly always (92–98% of trials) touched the box. So, in combination, the
two tasks showed that, when reward depends on it, monkeys with striate cortex
lesions can localise visual stimuli in the ‘blind’ hemiﬁeld, but that when they have
the option of getting reward without localisation, they act as they have learned to do
when no stimulus was presented.
Cowey and Stoerig’s ﬁndings show that, if monkeys are conscious, they exhibit
blindsight in much the same way as human subjects. But that is to make the
(plausible) assumption that some non-human animals can be conscious, not to test it.
Cowey and Stoerig’s studies do not demonstrate, or seek to demonstrate, that intact
monkeys are perceptually conscious of the visual stimuli to which the respond. This
is a perfectly reasonable assumption in the sense that it accords with most people’s
intuitions, and it is put to good scientiﬁc use in their research. It is used to test a
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humans and monkeys, against an alternative ‘encephalization’ hypothesis, which
suggests that hominid evolution involved migration of visual function within the
brain, and therefore that these lesions will have different effects in the two species.
If one assumes that intact monkeys are conscious of the visual stimuli to which they
respond, then Cowey and Stoerig’s results support the blindsight hypothesis, with
loss of consciousness following striate cortex lesions. However, if one questions this
assumption, in the way that is necessary when the purpose of enquiry is to ﬁnd out
whether animals are conscious, its justiﬁcation turns out to depend, not on careful
functional analysis of visual perception, but on reasoning by analogy from one’s
own case (Heyes 2008). When I respond to visual stimuli I tend to be conscious of
them, therefore when a monkey responds to similar stimuli under comparable
conditions, I assume that he is also conscious of them. Below we argue that a more
secure inference should be based on obtaining a detailed functional characterisation
of how humans perform the task when they do so in a consciousness-involving way,
and carrying that over as the basis of tests in other animals.
Our principal concern in this section has been to point out that Cowey and
Stoerig’s work, and other research that makes good scientiﬁc use of the assumption
that nonhuman animals are conscious, does not furnish strong evidence that other
animals are conscious.
Hampton (2001)
Hampton (2001, Experiment 3) used a memory discrimination task to produce good
evidence for meta-representation in rhesus monkeys. Although he disclaimed any
attempt to be studying the subjective experiences of his animal subjects (p. 5359),
claiming that the experiences associated with remembering cannot be studied in
non-human animals (p. 5362), we argue that Hampton’s method can form the basis
of experiments that would furnish evidence about this deeper issue.
At the beginning of each trial in Hampton’s procedure, the monkey was shown
one of four pictures on a computer screen (a new set each day). After picture
presentation, there was a delay of variable duration (12.5–200 s), in which the
screen was blank. After the delay, the monkey was usually required to touch one of
two ﬂags on the screen. Touching the ‘test ﬂag’ resulted in the monkey being
presented with a display containing all four pictures. If he selected from this array
the picture he had seen at the beginning of the trial, he received a preferred reward, a
peanut. By touching the other ‘escape ﬂag’ the monkey could avoid the test but be
sure of a lesser reward, a pellet of ordinary primate food (Fig. 1).
The result of the experiment was that the frequency with which the monkey
chose the escape ﬂag over the test ﬂag increased with the duration of the delay after
the original picture was presented. This pattern is consistent with the use of meta-
representation by the monkey of its perceptual memory. That is, because memories
fade over time, one would expect the probability of choosing the escape key to
increase with delay if the monkey’s decision whether to press the test key or the
escape key depended on the strength of an internal representation of the sample
stimulus. However, this relationship between choice of the escape key and delay
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duration of the delay since the original image was presented. He may simply have
learned that test taking tends to have a happy result when the trial started a short
time ago, and an unhappy result when it started a long time ago. That would be to
base the decision on a ﬁrst-order representation of the delay rather than a meta-
representation of the memory trace.
To test the ﬁrst-order representational hypothesis against the meta-representa-
tional hypothesis, Hampton compared the accuracy of the monkey’s performance on
trials like those described above when he chose to take the test, with trials when he
was forced to take the test. Approximately one-third of trials at each delay duration
were forced trials. In these forced trials, only the test ﬂag appeared at the choice
stage. Hampton found that, when tests were forced, the proportion of trials in which
the monkey correctly identiﬁed the sample picture declined as the duration of the
delay increased, but when tests were chosen, accuracy remained high even at longer
delays. If, in choice trials, the monkey’s decision to press the test key or the escape
key had been based solely on delay duration, one would have expected to see the
same relationship between accuracy and delay duration in chosen and forced trials.
Given that it declined with increasing delay in forced trials—presumably because
the monkey was, in fact, forgetting the sample—then it should also have declined, at
the same rate, in chosen trials because, by hypothesis, the monkey was using choice
trials only to avoid taking the test at longer delays, and this could not be done in
Fig. 1 The task structure in Hampton (2001)
Metamemory as evidence of animal consciousness 101
123forced trials. The observed pattern—preserved accuracy at longer delays in chosen
trials—implies that the monkey’s use of the escape key enabled him, at each of the
longer delays, to avoid taking the test when he was unlikely to pass it. The strength
of the monkey’s memory trace on any given trial will have been a powerful
determinant of whether he was likely to pass the test. Therefore, having excluded
the possibility that the monkey was basing his decisions solely on delay duration,
the accuracy-preserving effect of his decisions makes it plausible that they were
modulated by the strength of the monkey’s own memory of the stimulus.
Foote and Crystal (2007) recently reported evidence of metamemory in rats.
Although their procedure is similar to Hampton’s in many respects, there were two
crucial differences: the equivalent of the escape key (a hole into which the rat could
poke its nose) was present, but not illuminated, on forced trials; and the rats made
their discriminative responses at constant locations over trials. The ﬁrst of these
deviations from Hampton’s procedure means that weaker performance in difﬁcult
forced tests than in difﬁcult chosen tests could have been related to erroneous entry
to the escape hole on forced trials. The second raises the possibility that each rat’s
choice of the test key versus the escape key was regulated by the position of its body
relative to the response keys—an object-level, public motor cue. The potential for
use of public motor cues—stimuli generated by the animals’ own movements, rather
than an internal representation—also makes the results of ‘conﬁdence judgement’
experiments less compelling than Hampton’s. In experiments of this kind (e.g.,
Kornell et al. 2007) commentary key responses are made immediately after the
monkey has made its discriminative response. Therefore, commentary key
responses could be controlled, not by an internal representation, but by some
publicly observable feature (e.g., latency) of the preceding response.
It would be good to see a replication of Hampton (2001), in which the same result
was obtained for more than one monkey, but since we don’t think meta-
representation is sufﬁcient for consciousness, further experiments would be needed
in any event to show that this is the type of metamemory that does the trick. We
explain in section ‘‘Testing for Meta-Memory’’ below what kind of additional
empirical work should be done to test for consciousness-involving metamemory.
Meta-Memory: high level meta-representation
Low level meta-representation is not sufﬁcient for consciousness
We saw in the last subsection that Hampton (2001) offers evidence that a rhesus
monkey can solve the memory discrimination task without relying on an external
cue, instead using the strength of its own perceptual memory state as an internal cue
for whether or not it is likely to succeed on a subsequent matching-to-sample task.
We agree with Hampton that that is not yet evidence for consciousness in monkeys.
However, we argue in this subsection that Hampton’s result is indeed evidence for
meta-representation.
As Reder (1996) has argued, there are important differences in the literature about
what ‘metacognitive’ amounts to. Perner (1991) identiﬁes meta-representational
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relations’. Similarly, we take meta-level contents to be those which concern the
thinker’s own representational states (e.g., I am visually representing a red rose on
the table). Object-level states do not (e.g., there is a red rose on the table).
The results of Hampton’s experiment suggest that the monkey had an internal
state, connected to its opt-out behaviour, which covaried with the strength of its
recall of the visual stimulus, irrespective of which particular stimulus was being
recalled. This accords with Hampton’s suggestion that the monkey might have an
internal ‘‘ﬂag’’ for the presence or absence of a memory (p. 5362). Why think the
internal ‘‘ﬂag’’ is a representation at all? Shea (2007) argues that meeting the
following condition is sufﬁcient to count as a species of internal representation: the
animal acquires a new internal state R as a result of learning, the internal state R
correlates with the state P of another system and leads to behaviour, and the
behavioural output in response to R makes sense in the light of the property P with
which it correlates (to state it informally). The monkey’s internal ‘‘ﬂag’’ is an R that
meets that sufﬁcient condition. The property with which it correlates happens also to
be internal: the presence or strength of a perceptual memory trace.
What is the content of this representation? Intuitively, the monkey makes a
mistake if it opts for the test when it doesn’t remember the stimulus, and it also
makes a mistake when it opts out of the test when it does have an accurate memory
trace of the stimulus. These intuitive correctness conditions line up with a plausible
account of the function of the representation. Its purpose is to keep track of
memories. Without offering a full-scale theory of content, these considerations still
suggest that the most plausible content for this internal state is meta-representa-
tional—something like I have a memory of a visual stimulus.
1
We have been working with a sufﬁcient condition for being a representation that
is relatively easy to meet. There is no reason to think of the representation as
‘cognitive’ in the way that term is typically used in the metacognition literature.
Relatively simple systems like those found in computers, subpersonal brain
processing and animal signalling contain states with correctness conditions or
satisfaction conditions. They would not count as ‘cognitive’. None displays the kind
of psychological sophistication of human beliefs and desires, say (although they
may in other respects be more sophisticated). We call them low level represen-
tations. We use ‘low level’ versus ‘high level’ not as a value judgement, but to mark
this particular kind of variation in psychological sophistication of the representa-
tional states. That distinction is orthogonal to the distinction between object-level
and meta-level contents. High level representations like beliefs can have both
object-level contents (there was a red rose) and meta-level contents (I can
remember a red rose). Low level representations may also have meta-level contents
(e.g., when a computer keeps track of its own memory registers).
As we use the term, low level representations are non-conceptual, need not be in
the space of reasons, may be coarse-grained, need not be at the personal level, and
do not divide into a range of different mental attitudes such as believing, desiring,
1 Although we use a structured (linguistic) representation to convey the content, we are not suggesting
that the monkey’s representational state has constituent structure or conceptual content.
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mance in many metacognition experiments in terms of belief and desires with
merely object-level contents. These explanations nevertheless presuppose a
relatively high level of psychological sophistication because they attribute to
animals states with the functional sophistication of beliefs and desires. The
considerations we have offered suggest that Hampton’s monkey may have a meta-
variety of a relatively low level species of representation. Relatively little is needed
for a new state driving rewarded behaviour to count as a meta-representation
according to the sufﬁcient condition mentioned above. Such meta-representations
can arise in systems like current computers which are very unlikely to be conscious.
Accordingly, we argue that this kind of low level meta-representation is not, on its
own, good evidence for consciousness. Something must be added if it is to be turned
into a plausible candidate for our condition C. In this subsection we investigate
possible additions, to arrive at a characterisation of a metamemory mechanism
which is plausibly consciousness-involving, which we call ‘high level Meta-
Memory’, or just ‘Meta-Memory’.
To turn it into an appropriate condition C, we need the mechanism for meta-
representation to meet some further conditions: condition C = low level meta-
representation plus X ? Y ? Z. As we’ve said already, some of these conditions
may concern neural structures and processes, for example particular brain areas
(maybe only meta-representation in the prefrontal cortex is consciousness-involv-
ing) or processes (perhaps synchrony at the gamma-wave frequency is required).
Since our aim is a functional characterisation of the consciousness-involving
mechanism, we focus on additional requirements that can be characterised
functionally (the X of X ? Y ? Z, as it were).
Philosophers have proposed various candidates for this additional factor X.S o m e
argue that the meta-representation must have propositional structure (Rosenthal
2005). But to have thoughts with propositional structure requires a sophisticated
capacity with powers akin to those of linguistic processing, which returns us to the
problem of tying consciousness too tightly to something like language, and so ruling
out animal consciousness at the start of the enquiry. Rosenthal does not claim that
only creatures with language can have thoughts with propositional structure, but
without the capacity for linguistic communication, it is very hard to gather evidence
that an animal does have thoughts with propositional structure. In particular, the
ability to categorise together a range of different stimuli, which is often the basis for
studying ‘concepts’ in non-linguistic animals, is consistent with such generalisation
behaviour being mediated by propositional structure or by non-conceptual
representations. As a result, a test of consciousness that relies on ﬁnding
representations with propositional structure would be hard to apply in non-linguistic
animals. It is possible that the potential for consciousness does, in fact, depend on
the capacity to give a verbal report, or on some important correlate of that ability—
for example, possession of a language of thought, or the potential to code mental
contents in propositionally-structured form. However, the case in favour of
language-dependence and its cousins is not currently so strong that it justiﬁes blank
denial that animals are conscious. If we were to make this assumption, we would not
only risk a major Type 2 error (concluding the phenomenon is absent when it is
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investigation of animal consciousness to clarify and extend theories of
consciousness.
In searching for the additional factor X, other philosophers argue that only ﬁne-
grained contents are made conscious by meta-representation (Carruthers 2000). That
proposal depends upon all perceptual experiences having such ﬁneness of grain (cf.
the experienced location of a touch on your back). But it does attempt to connect
with the kinds of conscious experience that seem, from the ﬁrst person perspective,
to be involved in memory discrimination tasks, even if their ﬁneness of grain is a
contingent feature with respect to their being conscious. A third proposal is that
Meta-Memory brings the perceptual memory into the space of reasons (McDowell
1994), making it available for the rational control of action (Baars 1988; Dehaene
and Naccache 2001).
2 That, too, connects with an intuitive ﬁrst-person perspective
on memory discrimination tasks. When we use our own conscious recall of the
perceptual stimulus to form an internal prediction of whether or not we will be able
to match-to-sample, and then act on that prediction, it seems that information about
the stimulus is thereby available to inform any kind of voluntary action (it is
‘poised’ to be acted on in any of a variety of ways). We are not suggesting that this
would be the only way that human subjects could perform a Hampton-style memory
discrimination task. But we argue that it is plausible that, when subjects succeed on
the task by making use of their conscious perceptual memory of the stimulus,
information about that perceptual memory is available to be consumed by any
action system.
It is notoriously hard to spell-out this seeming availability. It has been argued that
it is a distinctive functional property of human declarative memory (which is taken
to be conscious) that subjects are able to discern the presence and absence of such
memories (Tulving and Schacter 1990). Global availability is related, but goes
further. It has at least two aspects. First, the way I keep track of whether I remember
the stimulus is not proprietarily connected to a particular external cue, but is
modulated in the same way by quality of the perceptual stimulus, delay since the
stimulus offset, distraction, etc. Secondly, the representation of whether I remember
can be deployed in the control of a range of different actions, rather than being
dedicated to the service of only one project. In short, considering the philosophical
positions and reﬂecting on conscious memory discrimination tasks from the ﬁrst-
person perspective brings us to the following characterisation of a potential
additional factor X. In performing a memory discrimination task in a way that
depends upon my consciously recalling the perceptual stimulus, I seem to have a
representation, cued by my own memory trace of the stimulus, which is tokened in a
variety of situations, and which is available for the control of a range of different
actions and could be deployed to different ends were I given a different task. Such a
representation would likely count as a meta-representation, following the discussion
above, but it is a meta-representation which, in addition, can be tokened in a variety
2 The idea of incorporation in the space of reasons derives from McDowell 1994. The condition we arrive
at below is closer to the global availability for the rational control of action discussed by Baars, and by
Dehaene and Naccache, which is less demanding than McDowell’s notion.
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requirement, when added to meta-representation, turns it into a plausible candidate
for a functional characterisation of a consciousness-involving mechanism.
In sum, our functional characterisation, susceptible to empirical investigation in
other animals, of the mechanism deployed in Meta-Memory (i.e., high level
consciousness-involving metamemory) is as follows.
Condition C
The subject
3 represents that she has a memory of a perceptual stimulus, where
that meta-representation can be tokened in a variety of different situations and
can be deployed to control a range of different actions.
4
We have generated condition C by introspective reﬂection on our own case. That
is only a weak source of evidential support. It is enough, however, to be a plausible
basis for generating a hypothesis for empirical test. It is a substantial empirical issue
whether condition C does in fact correlate in humans with conscious recall of a
perceptual stimulus as measured by subjects’ verbal reports. That is, do human
subjects meet condition C only when they report being conscious, and are they ever
conscious without meeting condition C? The argument above makes it plausible, but
does not prove, that condition C may correlate with other measures of conscious-
ness—which is enough to motivate a proper empirical investigation.
Testing for Meta-Memory
Our condition C is susceptible to empirical test. The question to ask is whether
performance on one type of memory discrimination task transfers readily to other
memory discrimination tasks; that is, to use a triangulation approach (Campbell
1954; Heyes 1998). Two categories of transfer test must be combined to show that
an animal meets condition C in a Hampton-type memory discrimination task. The
ﬁrst category of experiments demonstrate decoupling of the metamemory ability
from any particular perceptual cue. For example, does an ability to solve Hampton’s
task where memory is degraded by a delay between initial stimulus presentation and
the matching task transfer to trials where the accuracy of memory depends instead
on variations in the duration or the intensity of initial stimulus presentation? The
second category of transfer task looks for output generalisation: the ability to make
use of the metamemory in a range of different tasks. For example, we might ask
whether the type of representation that regulates opt-out behaviour in Hampton’s
memory test (matching-to-sample) could also be used to guide behaviour in a
3 We use ‘subject’ to refer to the organism or system which encounters the perceptual stimulus, has a
memory of it, and tokens a representation of that memory. We do not presuppose that being a subject in
this sense involves a sense of self.
4 We are deliberately vague about the modal claim ‘can be deployed’, since the aim is to match
the intuitive ease or difﬁculty with which information about conscious representations can be deployed in
the rational control of a range of different actions. For present purposes, we do not need to complete the
separate project of making that notion more precise. The rough idea is that the meta-representation could
be used for new projects simply by the animal changing its preferences or by it moving to an environment
with a different reward structure, without having to undergo further learning in the domain of keeping
track of perceptual recall (i.e., without having to undergo further meta-representational development).
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additional tests would be satisﬁed. If Hampton is right that the monkey’s opt-out
behaviour is driven by an internal ‘‘ﬂag’’ tied to the perceptual memory trace, then
all ways of degrading that memory trace (delay, stimulus duration, stimulus
intensity) would have the same effects. But that still needs to be tested. And it
remains an open possibility that the animals perform the experiment in an
informationally-encapsulated way: their training may have allowed them to keep
track of the way the memory trace varies in the given experimental set up, but
without being able to carry that over to situations where the memory trace varies in
other ways, or where the information about the memory trace has to be used for
different actions.
Obviously, these transfer experiments would be far from trivial. It would take a
huge amount of work to design and implement effective experiments testing for the
presence or absence of a mechanism meeting condition C in even just one other
species. But there is no difﬁculty in principle with carrying out such investigations.
Our condition C is both plausibly consciousness-involving in humans and yet
susceptible to empirical test in other animals. In the remainder of this section we
outline in a little more detail some potential experimental paradigms.
Transfer across perceptual cues
Testing for transfer across situations would be relatively straightforward, and has
been discussed previously in the experimental literature on metacognition in
animals (e.g., Inman and Shettleworth 1999). For example, monkeys would ﬁrst be
trained on Hampton’s task, in which the strength of the animal’s memory for the
initial stimulus is manipulated by varying retention interval, i.e., the delay between
presentation of the initial stimulus and the point at which the monkey has the choice
of touching the test ﬂag or the escape ﬂag. Then, once the monkeys were responding
in a way that suggests high level Meta-Memory—choosing to escape more often on
long than short delay trials—occasional probe trials would be introduced. In these
probe trials, the retention interval would be ﬁxed and of relatively short duration,
but the duration of the initial stimulus would vary. Sometimes it would be very
brief, making the stimulus hard to encode and therefore to remember, and on other
probe trials the initial stimulus would be on the screen for a longer period, making it
easy to encode and remember. If a monkey selected the test ﬂag in a probe trial, he
would proceed to the usual, four-choice matching-to-sample test, but the test
outcome would not be contingent on his response; he would be rewarded (or not
rewarded) regardless of the image he selected. Therefore, and crucially, the
monkeys would not have the opportunity to learn across probe trials that initial
stimulus duration predicts test outcomes. Under these conditions, if Meta-Memory
is indeed driving the monkeys’ opt-out behaviour in the main task, then one would
expect them to opt-out more often in probe trials with short than with long stimulus
durations. This would be expected because, according to the Meta-Memory
hypothesis, opt-out behaviour in the main task depends on the strength of a memory
trace, not on the duration of the retention interval per se, and therefore the animal’s
tendency to take the test when the memory is strong but not when it is weak should
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interval.
As with any single experiment, the outcome of this experiment would not be
conclusive. Non-contingent reward on probe trials would ensure that the animals
could not learn in the course of the experiment that stimulus duration predicts test
outcomes, but it is not impossible that the animals would have learned this from their
day-to-day experience before the experiment began. Transfer in a variety of different
types of probe test, in which memory strength was manipulated not only by stimulus
duration but also by, for example, the presentation of distractors before or after
stimulus presentation, would strengthen the case for Meta-Memory. However, to rule
out the possibility that success on probe trials was due to pre-experimental learning
about relationships between perceptual cues and test outcomes, it would be necessary
to use a novel, and possibly invasive, manipulation. If monkeys showed transfer in
probe trials where memory strength was manipulated by direct neurochemical or
neuro-electrophysiological means, and if one included appropriate sham controls,
then we could be conﬁdent that pre-experimental learning was not responsible.
Transfer across actions/outputs
In Hampton’s experiment, monkeys touched a ﬂag of one colour to take the four-
choice memory test and a ﬂag of different colour to escape the test. To assess
transfer across action types, initial training would be followed by the introduction of
probe trials with different response requirements. For example, the monkeys might
be required to pull one of two levers, rather than to touch one of two ﬂags, to make
their choice, or the matching-to-sample test might be changed to a non-matching-to-
sample test. In the latter case, two images would appear on the screen, the initial
stimulus and an alternative, and the monkey would be rewarded only if he touched
the alternative image. Naturally it would take a while for the monkeys to learn the
new contingencies—that pulling the left lever activates the test, or that non-
matching performance is required in the two-choice test—but if their performance
on the main task depends on Meta-Memory, then eventually they should show the
same tendencies in probe trials as in trials on the main task, i.e., to opt-out more
often when the retention interval was long, and to show greater accuracy at longer
intervals in choice trials than in forced trials.
5
The payoff
Amongst many tasks that may be consciousness-involving, we have examined
metamemory. Hampton (2001) shows that monkeys can predict whether they are
themselves likely to succeed at a visual matching-to-sample task. Although not
5 Even if monkeys passed all of these transfer tests, it could be argued that their memory state is merely
‘driving’ their choice behaviour; that it plays an important causal role in generating their behaviour, but
not by virtue of being understood by the animal as a memory. If consciousness of a memory were thought
to require understanding the internal state as a memory, then more demanding empirical tests would be
required, like those developed in the literature on theory of mind in nonhuman animals.
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its own perceptual recall, rather than any external cue, to perform this task. However,
meta-representation is not, on its own, plausibly good evidence for consciousness.
What more is needed? By setting ourselves the objective of ﬁnding a condition which
is open to empirical conﬁrmation and disconﬁrmation in animals, we have avoided
anthropocentric answers, and thus conditions which may correlate only in humans
with the presence and absence of consciousness. We labelled the result high level
Meta-Memory: a subject’s representation of her memory of a perceptual stimulus,
where that meta-representation can be tokened in a variety of different situations and
can be deployed to control a range of different actions. Meta-representations which
meet that further condition are plausibly good evidence for consciousness. And ﬁrst-
person reﬂection on consciously-performed memory discrimination tasks suggests
that our conscious recall of the perceptual stimulus does indeed meet this condition,
although that prima facie case must be substantiated by further empirical
investigation. Thus, the payoff from our investigation of animal consciousness is
not just to show, in the face of methodological scepticism, that it is an empirically-
tractable question. It has also led us to a sharper conception of the nature of
consciousness itself, in humans and other animals, forcing us to specify in greater
detail the functional proﬁle of the mechanisms deployed by subjects when they rely
on consciousness to solve a memory discrimination task.
Those who view higher order thought as necessary for consciousness can take our
condition C as a candidate for upgrading meta-representation into a sufﬁcient
condition for consciousness. But taking condition C as partly constitutive of
consciousness would join higher order thought theories in making consciousness a
matter of having certain dispositions. Our claim is less controversial: that
discovering Meta-Memory in animals would be good evidence that they are
conscious. That is a substantial claim, of considerable interest whether or not higher
order theories are right. But this story has a ﬁnal twist. We have been assuming
throughout that, to solve a memory discrimination task without using an external
cue, a subject would have to use some additional internal state, over and above its
perceptual memory. We argued that, if so, the new representation would likely be a
meta-representation, rather than having object-level contents. Our concern was to
see what needed to be added to meta-representation, to turn it into a plausibly
consciousness-involving mechanism. However, once we’ve seen that additional
factor X, we can ask whether meta-representation is a necessary part of the
evidential condition C, or whether the factor X would, on its own, be good evidence
for consciousness. Assessing the theoretical considerations in favour of that
hypothesis and making suggestions for testing it empirically would be a paper in its
own right. We restrict ourselves to observing that our factor X is similar to
Dehaene’s global workspace hypothesis (Dehaene and Naccache 2001), which is
formulated as a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for a mechanism to be conscious.
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